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SEEKING A SECOND OPINION: A CALL FOR
CONGRESSIONAL EVALUATION OF ANTIASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS IN EMPLOYEE
HEALTH PLANS
Jordan Davis*
In the health insurance context, anti-assignment provisions are
contractual clauses that restrict an insured individual’s ability to assign
rights due under a health plan to another party, such as a medical provider.
As these provisions have become increasingly prevalent in employersponsored health plan agreements, they have effectively stripped medical
providers of enforcement and litigation rights previously utilized under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)—the relevant
federal regulation governing employee benefit plans, including health
insurance plans.
This Note examines these effects in light of ERISA’s intended protections
of employees participating in employer-sponsored benefit plans and
considers whether congressional intervention is warranted to address the
respective impacts as a result. This Note contends that while persuasive
arguments exist both in support of a need for reform and for sufficiency of
the status quo, arguments around these dueling views tend to draw on merely
anecdotal evidence and theoretical economic contestations. Accordingly,
this Note argues that Congress should develop empirical evidence to
determine whether intervention is needed and proposes plausible long-term
amendments to ERISA, should they be warranted, along with interim
solutions to help address problematic impacts while such study is conducted.
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INTRODUCTION
The importance of gaining health insurance coverage for a household’s
financial security and stability is undisputed. But the lesson here is that
gaining coverage is not the end of the battle . . . .
—Erin C. Fuse Brown1

A modern part of this battle is the increasingly common trend of health
insurance companies adding provisions into consumer contracts that restrict
patients’ ability to effectively assign rights and duties due under their health
insurance plans to other parties.2
These clauses, known as anti-assignment provisions, often specifically
intend to inhibit the transfer of such rights to health care providers, such as
doctors and hospitals, leading to the providers facing steep obstacles when
seeking adequate reimbursement from the insurance companies for services
rendered.3 This practice has hampered both the providers’ ability to enforce
the terms of a patient’s employer-sponsored health insurance plan against
insurers and their ability to bring suit against insurers for nonpayment or
insufficient payment.4
Dr. Ross Cooperman’s experience with patient LPH5 illustrates the
implications outlined above.
In 2018, LPH required a two-stage,
postmastectomy breast reconstruction following her treatment for breast
cancer.6 Because LPH’s health insurance plan had no doctor to perform the
procedure in-network, LPH sought care from Dr. Cooperman, an out-ofnetwork7 provider.8 Despite Dr. Cooperman’s reaching a compensation
agreement with the insurance company before performing the surgeries, the
insurance company paid Dr. Cooperman only $5485.66 of the $431,592
billed.9
With it being unlikely that Dr. Cooperman would recover the sizable
outstanding balance directly from LPH, his most realistic option for
recovering the remainder of the expected fee was suing the insurance

1. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 WASH. U. L.
REV. 127, 200 (2017).
2. See infra Part I.C. See generally David M. Hyman et al., Hey, What About Me?: Nonparticipating Healthcare Providers’ Ability to Sue Health Insurance Companies Regarding
Payment of Claims, N.J. LAW., Feb. 2007, at 37.
3. See Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 38.
4. Tania E. Yusaf, The Out-of-Network Reimbursement System Is out of Control: An
Analysis of Payment by Managed Care Organizations to Out-of-Network Providers, 14
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 85, 91–92 (2010); see infra Parts I.C, II.A.2.
5. Patients’ names in health-related lawsuits are often anonymized for privacy purposes.
6. Cooperman, M.D., LLC ex rel. Patient LPH v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of
N.J., No. 19-CV-19225, 2020 WL 5422801, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2020), motion for
reconsideration denied, No. 19-CV-19225, 2020 WL 7264144 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2020), appeal
dismissed sub nom., Ross Cooperman MD LLC v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 202899, 2020 WL 8921018 (3d Cir. 2020).
7. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of in-network versus out-of-network providers.
8. Cooperman, 2020 WL 5422801, at *1.
9. Id. at *2.

2268

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

company.10 Dr. Cooperman, like many providers in his position, however,
ran into a major roadblock in that effort: the anti-assignment provision in
LPH’s insurance agreement.11 The provision barred LPH from assigning the
right of recovery to Dr. Cooperman, essentially stripping Dr. Cooperman of
the ability to bring a claim on LPH’s behalf12 under the relevant federal cause
of action.13 Accordingly, the court dismissed Dr. Cooperman’s claim,
leaving him with no way of collecting the outstanding balance from the
insurance company.14
This Note examines whether the impact of anti-assignment provisions
warrants remedial action by Congress and/or the executive branch.15 More
specifically, it seeks to determine whether the effect of anti-assignment
provisions undermines the intended federal law protections of employee
welfare benefit plans, which include employer-sponsored employee health
insurance plans like LPH’s.
Part I examines key background concepts, including the relevant federal
legislation, the modern healthcare16 and health insurance landscape, and the
importance of contractual assignment of healthcare benefits generally. Part
II identifies the impact of valid and enforceable anti-assignment provisions
in healthcare contracts and outlines arguments as to whether or not federal
intervention is warranted. Finally, Part III argues that Congress should
undertake a comprehensive, empirical examination of anti-assignment
provision before potentially moving forward on an amendment to existing
federal law. Part III also discusses interim solutions that could be utilized
during the assessment period to mitigate the existing effects of antiassignment provisions.
I. THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE LANDSCAPE
While a visit to your local physician may seem like a fairly simple
endeavor, the relevant laws and insurance processes at work behind the
scenes are anything but straightforward. Part I of this Note presents
background on federal law governing employer-sponsored health insurance
plans and the role that contractual relationships play in the delivery of
medical services. Part I.A outlines the contours of the Employment

10. See id.
11. See id. at *3–4.
12. See infra Part I.C (explaining the relevance of assignment in the health insurance
context).
13. See Cooperman, 2020 WL 5422801, at *3–4; infra Part II.A.2.
14. See Cooperman, 2020 WL 5422801, at *4.
15. This Note examines these branches specifically, as federal courts have already taken
a position on the anti-assignment provisions issue, as detailed in Parts II.A.1 and III.A below.
16. This Note proceeds by using “healthcare” to refer to the general system or industry
that encompasses the delivery of medical-related services to patients or customers and “health
care” to refer specifically to medical providers’ delivery of medical-related services to a
patient or customer. See Healthcare vs. Health Care, ARCADIA: THE FINAL WORD (June 30,
2014),
https://arcadia.io/final-word-healthcare-vs-health-care
[https://perma.cc/3KT2ZWBT].
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Retirement Income Security Act of 197417 (ERISA), a federal statute
governing employee benefit plans, and its relevance to health insurance. Part
I.B discusses how health insurance operates, with a focus on the importance
of networks of providers. Part I.C examines the contractual nature of health
insurance plans, specifically the right to assign benefits due under a plan and
the increasingly popular effort by insurers to inhibit such assignments.
A. A Primer on ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA in response to the growth of employee benefit
plans in both scope and number.18 The term “employee benefit plans” refers
to two distinct types of programs typically offered by employers: pension
benefit plans and welfare benefit plans.19
A pension benefit plan is an employer-sponsored plan that provides
retirement income to employees.20 A welfare benefit plan—the type that
includes health plans and is therefore critical to this Note—is defined as:
“any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization . . . for the purpose of providing its participants
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, . . .
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits.”21 ERISA serves as the
primary federal legislation regulating the administration of health insurance
plans offered by companies to their employees and disputes related to those
plans.22 It does so by establishing uniform standards governing the creation,
administration, and management of such plans.23
Though ERISA covers both pension and welfare plans,24 a review of
ERISA’s legislative history suggests that Congress was far more concerned
about pension plans during enactment.25 ERISA’s legislative history shows
that comprehensive findings from an investigation of consumer abuses in the

17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.
18. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§ 1–2,
88 Stat. 829, 829–33 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001, § 1001 note) (discussing
relevant background and purpose).
19. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1002(2)(A).
20. See id. § 1002(2)(A).
21. Id. § 1002(1); see Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62
OKLA. L. REV. 89, 107 (2009) (“An ‘employee welfare benefit plan’ is basically any organized
provision of health or disability insurance by an employer.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1))).
22. See Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445,
449 (3d Cir. 2018); Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 183; Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 38–39.
ERISA does not cover all types of group health plans. For instance, it does not cover plans
established or maintained by governmental entities or those that are church based. PETER R.
KONGSTVEDT, HEALTH INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE: WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW THEY
WORK 241 (5th ed. 2020).
23. Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“To achieve this goal, ERISA . . . [established] ‘various uniform standards, including rules
concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, for both pension and welfare
plans.’” (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983))).
24. See supra text accompanying note 19.
25. See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
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private pension industry were the foundation of the legislation.26 “Given
ERISA’s broad preemption of state laws related to all employee benefit
plans, ERISA’s legislative history is remarkable . . . for what it does not
contain. [It] provides no evidence that Congress seriously investigated,
studied, or debated any issues or concerns with nonpension employee benefit
plans.”27
To address the notable impact that participation in benefit plans had on
interstate commerce and employees and their families,28 Congress sought to
create “a [federal] uniform regulatory regime”29 that would “protect
interstate commerce” and “promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries” with respect to their participation in employee benefit plans.30
ERISA contains a “‘carefully integrated’ civil enforcement scheme”31 to
promote compliance with the respective rules and regulations and to provide
an avenue of relief in federal court for plan participants and beneficiaries.32
A remedial provision, section 502(a),33 in relevant part, creates a federal
private cause of action for plan participants34 and beneficiaries35
(collectively, “insureds”) to enforce the terms of employee welfare plans
and/or to recover benefits due under such plans.36 As noted by Justice
Thomas, section 502(a) “is a distinctive feature of ERISA, and [is] essential
to accomplish Congress’ purpose of creating a comprehensive statute for the
regulation of employee benefit plans.”37

26. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme
Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 972 (2000); see also
Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism, ERISA, and State Single-Payer
Health Care, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 389, 415 (2020) (“Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to
regulate pensions (hence the ‘Retirement Income Security’ in its title), but the statute’s broad
preemption language has wrought unintended consequences, blocking numerous state health
reform laws over the past forty years as impermissibly ‘relat[ing] to’ employer-sponsored
health insurance.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
27. Bogan, supra note 26, at 972 (emphasis added).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Congress was concerned with protecting against the
increasing prevalence of instances where employers and unions sought to use private pension
plan assets for purposes other than benefitting retired workers and their surviving dependents.
PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34443, SUMMARY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) 2 (2009). One such instance, where
an automobile company left thousands of workers and retirees without previously promised
pensions, prompted Congress to begin considering legislation around pension plans. Id.
29. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1001; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
31. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (quoting Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987)).
32. See PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 28, at 32; see also Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at
210 (“If a participant or beneficiary believes that benefits promised to him under the terms of
the plan are not provided, he can bring suit seeking provision of those benefits.”).
33. ERISA section 502(a) is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
34. A participant is an employee (or former employee) who is eligible (or may become
eligible) to receive benefits from an employee benefit plan. Id. § 1002(2)(7).
35. A beneficiary is a person designated by a participant or by an employee benefit plan’s
terms, who is entitled (or may become entitled) to benefits under such a plan. Id. § 1002(2)(8).
36. See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
37. Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 208.
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To ensure that the desired uniformity in employee benefit plan regulation
came to fruition,38 Congress opted to include broad, express preemption
provisions in the statutory text of ERISA.39 Under the doctrine of
preemption, federal laws supersede conflicting state laws.40 This concept is
premised on the Supremacy Clause, which invalidates state laws that
“interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress.”41 Representative
John Dent, a sponsor of the initial ERISA legislation, emphasized the
importance of the intended preemption, asserting his wish “to make note of
what is to many the crowning achievement of this legislation, the reservation
to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit
plans.”42
Two distinct sections of the statute establish express preemption: sections
502(a) and 514(a).43 Section 502(a) preempts state law claims that fall within
the scope of ERISA’s remedial provision.44 In other words, “any state-law
cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil
enforcement remedy”45 is preempted because it would “conflict[] with the
clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive.”46 As a
result, private litigants pursuing a lawsuit against an insurer, an employer, or
another sponsor of an employee welfare benefit plan often are left with a
single available course of action: a federal lawsuit under section 502 of
ERISA.47
Section 514(a) displaces an even broader category of state law by
establishing that ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws . . . [that] relate
to any employee benefit plan.”48 A state law relates to an employee benefit
plan when it either: (1) has a “connection with” or (2) contains a “reference
to” such a plan.49 Section 514 “has been construed extremely broadly to
displace a swath of state laws, including many state laws that regulate
provision of or payment for health care, because of their impermissible
38. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
39. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 208.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2; infra text accompanying note 41. See generally JAY B.
SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45825, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A LEGAL
PRIMER (2019). Preemption can generally occur in two distinct ways: expressly and
impliedly. Id. at 2. Express preemption occurs when a federal statute or regulation contains
language explicitly stating the intent of preemption. Id. Contrarily, implied preemption occurs
when a statute’s or regulation’s purpose and/or structure implicitly reflects a preemptive
intent. Id.
41. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
42. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,197
(1974)).
43. See PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 28, at 39. ERISA § 514(a) is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a).
44. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54–55 (1987)); see also PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 28, at 42.
45. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004).
46. Id.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 44–46.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016);
PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 28, at 39–42.
49. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983).
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connection to employee health plans.”50 Though states generally play the
“role as primary regulators of insurance,”51 ERISA’s preemption provisions
tend to supersede state efforts to legislate on employee benefit plans,
including health plans.52
B. The Modern Healthcare System and the Importance of Networks
To fully grasp the implications presented by anti-assignment provisions, it
is critical to first understand the inner workings of our modern system of
health insurance. At its most basic level, the concept of health insurance is a
simple one: individuals purchase it as a mechanism to avoid the “financial
risks of health care consumption, which tend[] to be both unpredictable and
extremely expensive.”53
A look beyond this elementary view, however, leads to a bevy of
confusion, littered with ambiguous acronyms, complex jargon, and an
inevitable litany of questions about how the health insurance system truly
functions.54 This section seeks to provide a baseline of knowledge to clarify
those uncertainties. Part I.B.1 outlines the evolution of healthcare and health
insurance to its current form, generally referred to as “managed care.” Part
I.B.2 explains the importance of out-of-network providers and the
implications of receiving care from them.
1. An Explanation of Managed Care
Before the inception of today’s healthcare approach, medical care and
health insurance operated on a “fee-for-service” basis.55 A fee-for-service
model is relatively straightforward: physicians render care to patients based
on their best judgment and bill either the patient or the patient’s insurance
company, if applicable, under the provider’s standard rates for those
services.56 An individual generally could seek and receive care from any
licensed medical physician, even a specialist, without a referral.57
50. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 184; see infra text accompanying notes 243–45.
51. See Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 144. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011–1015, states retain powers pertaining to regulation and taxation of insurance
companies. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 100. However, ERISA supersedes such legislation when
the respective state law seeks to regulate employee benefit plans as they pertain to participants,
as opposed to providers. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 184–85; see also supra text
accompanying notes 48–49.
52. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829–30 (1988).
53. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 136; see also Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de
Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance
Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 75, 81 (1993) (“Health insurance plans exist mainly
because of the consumer’s desire to share the financial risk arising from expenses associated
with treating (or preventing) an illness or injury.”).
54. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 30. See generally Weiner & de Lissovoy, supra
note 53.
55. See JASON S. LEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-913EPW, MANAGED HEALTH CARE: A
PRIMER 2–3 (1997).
56. See Yusaf, supra note 4, at 98.
57. See Weiner & de Lissovoy, supra note 53, at 76.
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Under this approach, insurers and providers did not have any sort of
contractual agreements stipulating, for example, specific fees—instead “[f]or
the most part, insurers let providers determine the rates and terms of
reimbursement.”58 Under the fee-for-service model, the delivery of healthrelated services and the payment for such services operated in an entirely
separate manner.59 However, towards the latter part of the twentieth century,
the healthcare industry, driven by evolution of its insurance counterpart,
started to see significant change—delivery of care and payment for it began
to merge.60
Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, costs and spending associated
with the provision of health care became an increasingly prevalent topic of
discussion in both American society and U.S. politics.61 From the
perspective of those supporting change, the fee-for-service model had
incentivized “healthcare providers to provide patients with ‘more care, not
less,’ [which] gave rise to concerns about mounting healthcare costs that
outstripped the value of care provided.”62 In other words, those calling for
change felt that providers were incentivized to provide extra, costly services
with little oversight to counterbalance those incentives.63 The increased
prevalence of this position changed U.S. health insurance, leading to the
promulgation of what we know today as managed care.64
The term “managed care” is essentially a catchall for various models of
health insurance, epitomized by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO)
and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) that have a common goal of
“aim[ing] to reduce healthcare costs without sacrificing quality of care by
creating networks of doctors.”65
Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, managed care, especially in the
form of HMOs, became increasingly popular, largely replacing the
traditional fee-for-service model.66 These managed care plans attracted
58. See id. at 77.
59. See LEE, supra note 55, at 2.
60. See id.
61. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 6–7; cf. LEE, supra note 55, at 4 (“The Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 . . . encouraged the development of HMOs by
providing federal funds . . . to help qualified HMOs through their start-up period.”).
62. Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2020)
(quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000)); see also LEE, supra note 55, at 4
(“Traditional fee-for-service payment arrangements—which dominated public and private
health care delivery systems—were seen by many as an important root cause of runaway
health care costs.”).
63. See LEE, supra note 55, at 2 (“Traditionally, [a provider] was exposed to few, if any,
incentives for efficiency or cost control.”).
64. KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 7.
65. Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 227; see also Carol K. Lucas & Michelle A.
Williams, The Rights of Nonparticipating Providers in a Managed Care World: Navigating
the Minefields of Balance Billing and Reasonable and Customary Payments, 3 J. HEALTH &
LIFE SCI. L. 132, 135 (2009) (“[M]anaged care refers to a prepaid system in which patients
(enrollees) trade free provider choice and the ability to self-refer to self-selected medical
providers in exchange for reduced out-of-pocket costs and certainty regarding financial
liability.”).
66. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 8.
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consumers with low premiums67 and reduced cost sharing68 in addition to
more extensive benefits—for example, prescription drug coverage—than
traditional insurance plans offered.69
The growth of HMOs skyrocketed over the last two decades of the
twentieth century and by 1999, sixty-three million individuals were enrolled
in a commercial HMO, as compared to just fifteen million in 1984.70
However, the HMO model was not the only form of managed care to arrive
on the scene during that period. In the late 1970s, PPOs came to the forefront
of the healthcare landscape71 and in 2016, nearly half of the employed
population had a PPO insurance plan, making it the most popular type of
managed care at that time.72 As a result, whereas traditional models of health
insurance accounted for 75 percent of the market in the mid-1980s, by the
mid-1990s, they held less than 33 percent of the market share and by 2000,
that share was in the single digits.73
Provider networks—groupings of medical professionals and facilities that
enter into contractual arrangements with insurance companies74—are the
“backbone” of these various types of managed care plans.75 One critical
element of these agreements between providers and insurers is the inclusion
of specified fee arrangements where, before service is rendered, the provider
and insurer have agreed on the amount the insurer will pay for each service
a provider renders to a patient.76 This approach facilitates insurer-imposed
cost restrictions on medical care and protects insurance companies from
surprise billing.77 This puts insurance companies in the driver’s seat,
whereas the historical fee-for-service model was consumer-centric, allowing
the patient and provider to agree on services.78
An individual enrolled in a managed care plan must generally use a
medical provider or facility that participates in the individual’s network to
take advantage of lower cost sharing offered by the plan79—in other words,
to obtain discounted rates for services received.80 Accordingly, the insured
67. A premium is the amount of money that an insured individual pays to the insurance
company to participate in one of the insurer’s health insurance plans. See id. at 293.
68. Cost sharing refers to the amount a member must pay out of pocket for each type of
covered benefit. Id. at 33. Types of cost sharing include: (1) copayments, meaning a fixed
dollar amount for a type of service paid to a provider; (2) coinsurance, meaning a percentage
of the total cost of a medical service that is covered by the insurance plan; and (3) deductibles,
meaning an amount of money that an insured individual must pay before the insurance plan
begins to contribute. Id. at 33–34.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 9.
72. See id. at 24.
73. Id. at 10.
74. See Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2020).
75. KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 53.
76. See id. at 45, 54.
77. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 88.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 56–58.
79. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
80. Weiner & de Lissovoy, supra note 53, at 84.
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must use the facilities, physicians, and/or other medical providers—i.e., the
network—that have contracted with the insurance company to receive the
savings anticipated by enrolling in the plan in the first place.81 Contrarily,
such savings are generally unavailable, only partly available, or only
available in select situations, should the insured individual seek services from
a provider who has not contracted with the insurance company, commonly
referred to as an out-of-network provider.82
From the providers’ perspective, there are a number of advantages
associated with becoming an in-network option for patients.83 First, innetwork providers have a greater likelihood of receiving repeat patients
because insureds enrolled in a given plan will seek out care, at least most of
the time, from in-network providers.84 Another advantage is that by entering
into a contract with the insurer, the provider is able to efficiently collect
payment for services because payment will come directly from the insurer,
rather than the patient.85 Additionally, rights related to payment and disputed
claims are typically defined within the insurer-provider agreement, which
provides a layer of protection and transparency before services are
rendered.86
2. The Impact of Receiving Out-of-Network Care
While insureds enrolled in managed care plans have a network of providers
to choose from when seeking health care services,87 certain circumstances
necessitate out-of-network care.88 This can have significant financial
ramifications depending on the specific terms of the insured’s plan and the
type of care received.89

81. See Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 228 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“[Managed care organizations], in essence, restrict an individual’s choice of healthcare
providers in exchange for access to and cost effectiveness of the healthcare they provide.”).
Further, an insured individual may be responsible for any charges by an out-of-network
provider above and beyond the insurer’s allowed charges, whereas this is not the case for innetwork care. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 45–46.
82. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 9; infra Part I.B.2.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 84–86.
84. See Yusaf, supra note 4, at 88, 118; supra text accompanying notes 79–81.
85. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 55 tbl.3.1; see also infra text accompanying notes
149–50.
86. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 55 tbl.3.1; Yusaf, supra note 4, at 90 (“There are
few payment conflicts between [managed care organizations] and network providers because
both parties are subject to contracts that specify the methods used for reimbursement.”); see
also Lucas & Williams, supra note 65, at 137 (“Within the contracted in-network universe,
although disputes arise, the contracts themselves will usually determine the rights and
obligations of the parties.”). However, in an out-of-network provision of services context, no
contract exists and “this orderly system collapses.” Id. at 137.
87. See infra Part I.B.1 for an explanation of provider networks.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 90, 94, 96.
89. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 105–
07; Part I.B.2.

2276

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

One such circumstance is the need for specialized care, such as a procedure
that no in-network provider is qualified or available to perform.90 For
example, in Plastic Surgery Center, P.A. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,91 a
plaintiff required facial reanimation surgery, “a niche procedure performed
by only a handful of surgeons in the United States”92—none of whom were
in-network providers.93
On the other hand, an individual may receive out-of-network care
unintentionally, incurring unanticipated costs in the process.94 For instance,
while a planned surgery may be performed by an in-network orthopedist at
an in-network hospital or surgical center, an anesthesiologist who does not
participate in the same managed care plan, and would bill for services as an
out-of-network provider, may be called on to assist in the operation.95
Lastly, patients may receive out-of-network care in emergency
situations.96 In such scenarios, the out-of-network service provider could be
the hospital that a patient is rushed to, a physician at that hospital, or even
the ambulance called to handle the emergency transport.97
The possibility of accidental or involuntary out-of-network care discussed
above becomes increasingly problematic as insurers have continually
narrowed networks of providers to keep premiums down.98 Networks with
fewer providers inherently create a greater likelihood that an insured will
receive care at an out-of-network facility in an emergency or from an out-ofnetwork provider inadvertently.99
While health plans cannot technically restrict an individual from receiving
medical care from an out-of-network provider,100 insurers can, and do, decide
what services will and will not be covered and, for those that are covered,
how much the insurer will pay.101 Because an out-of-network provider does
not have contractually stipulated fees with the insurance company,102 the
provider, on behalf of an insured patient, typically bills insurers whatever

90. See, e.g., Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir.
2020).
91. 967 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2020).
92. Id. at 223.
93. Id.
94. See Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 136.
95. See id. at 136–37.
96. Id. at 136.
97. Id.
98. See generally Daniel Polsky et al., Marketplace Plans with Narrow Physician
Networks Feature Lower Monthly Premiums Than Plans with Larger Networks, 35 HEALTH
AFFS. 1842 (2016). For a discussion of the related topic of “network adequacy,” see infra
notes 236–38.
99. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 138.
100. Of course, however, the potential financial impact of an unapproved or uncovered
treatment may disincentivize the patient from seeking treatment. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note
22, at 31.
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 77.
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their “normal” amount is—meaning the full and undiscounted rate103—for
each and every service rendered.104
Generally, an insurer receiving a bill from an out-of-network provider will
compensate that provider with a certain percentage of what the insurer deems
to be the “usual, customary, and reasonable charge” (UCR).105 Because the
UCR amount tends to be significantly less than the ultimate bill, the provider
often opts to bill the patient the difference between the two amounts—a
practice known as “balance billing,”106 which may be unexpected and
expensive.107 Not only can the bill be surprisingly large but it is often unclear
how the amount has been calculated in the first place, creating uncertainty
for patients.108
In addition to the impact on patients, who may be called on to make up the
difference, low out-of-network reimbursement has significant impacts on
providers.109 “Because health insurers have tremendous monopoly and
monopsony power, any reimbursement rate they determine is likely to
grossly underestimate the costs of services performed by . . . providers.”110
Further, because no contract exists between the out-of-network provider and
the patient’s insurer, the provider is simply forced to accept the payment rate
determined by the insurer—that is, unless the provider is interested in
litigating to collect the outstanding fee.111
McCulloch Orthopaedic Surgical Services, PLLC v. Aetna Inc.112 lends a
helpful illustration of the payment dilemma incurred by out-of-network
providers. There, an out-of-network provider sought to perform two knee
surgeries on a patient insured by Aetna, a large insurance company.113 Given
that the doctor, as an out-of-network provider, did not have a contractual set
fee arrangement with Aetna,114 a member of the doctor’s staff called Aetna
to confirm that Aetna would cover the costs of the operation.115 In reliance
on Aetna’s confirmation that it would reimburse 70 percent of the UCR rate
based on industry standards, the doctor conducted the surgeries and
accordingly billed $66,048.116 However, Aetna proceeded to pay the doctor
103. See Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 138.
104. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 90.
105. Id. For PPOs, the UCR reimbursement may be based on the insurer’s in-network fee
schedule, which is still likely to be less than the out-of-network provider’s billed charges, thus
warranting a bill to the insured for the balance. Id.
106. Id.
107. See David A. Hyman et al., Surprise Medical Bills: How to Protect Patients and Make
Care More Affordable, 108 GEO. L.J. 1655, 1656 (2020).
108. See Yusaf, supra note 4, at 105–06 (providing examples of the opaque language used
by insurers to explain how out-of-network reimbursement rates are determined).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 110–11.
110. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 103. However, litigation costs often dissuade taking action.
See id. at 104.
111. See id. at 102.
112. 857 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2017).
113. Id. at 144.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 77.
115. McCulloch, 857 F.3d at 144.
116. Id.
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a mere $15,267.51—far less than the anticipated amount based on Aetna’s
representation.117
Therefore, the doctor was left in the difficult position that out-of-network
providers often face: whether to simply accept the seemingly inadequate
payment, to bill the patient the massive difference, or to sue the insurer for
underpaying.118 However, even if the doctor chooses to pursue litigation
against the insurer, as Part II.A.2 explains, doing so is not always a feasible
option.119
C. The Importance of Contractual Assignment
Building on the basics of health insurance outlined above, Part I.C narrows
in on the contractual relationship between an insurer and an insured and the
involvement of providers in that relationship. Doing so is critical, as the
foundation of all managed care plans is the contractual agreement that
outlines “the various players’ rights and responsibilities.”120
Generally, a party to a contract may choose to assign a benefit (e.g., the
right to receive money) or an obligation (e.g., the requirement to make a
future payment) to another party.121 Under general principles of contract
law, a party is typically free to assign benefits “unless an assignment
would . . . materially alter the obligor’s duty of risk, or there is a provision in
the contract restricting its assignability, or the assignment would violate a
statute.”122 Critically, because parties are permitted to limit assignability if
desired, the right to assign persists only if not otherwise specified.123
In the managed care era, out-of-network providers have “almost
universally” sought patient agreement to an assignment of health insurance
benefits before rendering care.124 Simply put, the assignment transfers to the
health care provider the right to send claims directly to the insurer on a
patient’s behalf and receive compensation directly from the insurer for
services rendered, as occurs when in-network providers render services.125
As previously noted, an out-of-network health care provider is not a party to
a contract between an insurer and an insured.126 Accordingly, an assignment,
where valid, is necessary to convey to the provider the right to enforce the
117. Id.
118. See infra Part II.A.2.
119. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the challenges that providers face in pursuing
litigation against insurers when out-of-network patients’ health plans include anti-assignment
provisions).
120. Lucas & Williams, supra note 65, at 136.
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (outlining
contractual assignment rights generally).
122. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 15 (2020).
123. See Allhusen v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 1952) (“When
‘clear language’ is used, and the ‘plainest words . . . have been chosen’, parties may ‘limit the
freedom of alienation of rights and prohibit assignment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
State Bank v. Cent. Mercantile Bank, 162 N.E. 475, 477 (N.Y. 1928))).
124. See Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 228 (3d Cir. 2020).
125. Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 37–38.
126. Id. at 37; see supra text accompanying notes 74, 77, 82.
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terms of the patient’s plan against the insurer, including the right to seek
respective payment due under the patient’s plan.127
Importantly, under ERISA, with the right to recoup payment comes the
assignment of the right to sue the insurer of an insured receiving coverage
from an employee health plan.128 Because section 502(a) limits standing to
participants and beneficiaries only, as discussed above,129 the insured’s
assignment agreement is necessary to enable providers to bring suit directly
against an insurer under ERISA for any payment issues associated with the
provision of care.130
Recently, however, insurers, by incorporating anti-assignment provisions
into participant agreements, have increasingly limited or entirely prohibited
the ability of insureds to assign their rights to providers, disrupting the
previous norm.131 These clauses typically restrict assignment of the right to
enforce benefits or receive payment due under a plan and/or the right to
sue.132 A representative example of such a clause reads: “Aetna will not
accept an assignment to an out-of-network provider . . . of: The benefits due
under this contract; The right to receive payments due under this contract; or
Any claim you make for damages resulting from a breach or alleged breach,
of the terms of this contract.”133
From the insurers’ perspective, effective anti-assignment provisions help
to accomplish a number of goals simultaneously134: First, they entice
providers to come in network,135 increasing the insurer’s bargaining
127. Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 38; see City of Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. HealthPlus, Inc.,
156 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir. 1998) (“It is generally understood that ‘the assignee acquires rights
similar to those of the assignor, and is put in the same position with reference to those rights
as that in which the assignor stood at the time of assignment.’” (quoting 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON
& WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 404, at 5 (3d ed. 1960))).
128. See, e.g., N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 369, 373 (3d Cir. 2015);
Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have
‘carv[ed] out a narrow exception to the ERISA standing requirements’ to grant standing ‘to
healthcare providers to whom a beneficiary has assigned his claim in exchange for health
care.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Simon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 263 F.3d 176, 178 (2d
Cir. 2001))).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
130. See Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 228 (3d Cir. 2020);
supra text accompanying notes 32–36. Here, the term “standing” goes beyond the “Cases and
Controversies” requirement of Article III of the Constitution. Rather, it pertains to statutory
standing, which applies to legislatively created causes of action and “asks whether a statute
creating a private right of action authorizes a particular plaintiff to avail herself of that right
of action.” Pathak, supra note 21, at 91.
131. See, e.g., Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d
445, 447 (3d Cir. 2018).
132. Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 38.
133. McCulloch Orthopaedic Surgical Servs., PLLC v. Aetna Inc., 857 F.3d 141, 144 (2d
Cir. 2017). Part II.A.2 further explains how these rationales operate in the broader healthcare
context.
134. See Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 228; infra text accompanying notes 136–38.
135. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 91–92 (“Essentially, insurers argue that network providers
would have little incentive to contract with an insurer if they could receive reimbursement the
same way as an out-of-network provider could, without agreeing to a lower rate of
reimbursement.”); see supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
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power.136 Second, they help minimize unanticipated charges from out-ofnetwork providers “whose billing practices may vary significantly from those
of in-network providers.”137 Third, anti-assignment provisions minimize the
possibility of insurers being sued in a section 502(a) lawsuit by a provider
who has been assigned an insured patient’s health plan benefits.138 As
explained in Part II below, these purported goals have been achieved,
benefitting insurers and significantly impacting providers and insureds along
the way.
II. DO ANTI-ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS COMPORT WITH ERISA’S
INTENDED PROTECTIONS OF EMPLOYEES?
While insurers’ efforts toward obstructing assignment of benefits may
seem unremarkable at first, anti-assignment provisions within a participant
agreement can—and certainly do—have a major impact on the delivery of
medical services to out-of-network patients and related payment disputes.139
The question of whether federal government action is warranted in response
to this impact on insureds in employer-sponsored health plans, especially
given ERISA’s intended protections, arises as a result.140 Part II.A examines
this impact. Part II.B outlines the opposing arguments as to whether and why
federal intervention is warranted in the matter.
A. The Impact of Anti-assignment Provisions
Federal courts of appeals are undoubtedly familiar with challenges to the
validity and enforceability of anti-assignment provisions, as such arguments
have been litigated regularly.141 Part II.A.1 reviews how courts have
responded to these contentions. Part II.A.2 details the significant
ramifications of valid and enforceable anti-assignment provisions.
1. Federal Courts’ Assessment of Anti-assignment Provisions
To the dismay of providers and insureds alike, challenges to the validity
and enforceability of anti-assignment provisions have been universally
rejected.142 Courts typically cite two specific rationales to support this
136. Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 228.
137. Id.
138. See id.; supra Part I.C.
139. See infra Part II.A.2 (examining the impact that anti-assignment provisions have had
on providers’ ability to enforce the terms of out-of-network patients’ health plans against
insurers).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 255–62 for an explanation of why Congress is the
most likely body of the federal government to act on this issue.
141. See Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445,
453 (3d Cir. 2018) (surveying cases).
142. See, e.g., id. (“[E]very Circuit to have considered the arguments presented [against
anti-assignment] has rejected them . . . .”); see also LeTourneau Lifelike Orthotics &
Prosthetics, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 298 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Applying
universally recognized canons of contract interpretation to the plain wording of the instant
anti-assignment clause leads inexorably to the conclusion that any purported assignment of
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finding: First, fundamental principles of black letter contract law require
“that the terms of an unambiguous private contract must be enforced.”143
Second, the right to assign benefits due under a health plan can be freely
negotiated as part of the formation of health insurance contracts.144
With respect to upholding such provisions in light of ERISA’s intended
protections, the Third Circuit has noted that neither the statutory text nor
congressional policy “justify a departure from the general rule that courts will
enforce the terms of an agreement that was freely negotiated between
contracting parties.”145 Therefore, a clear and unambiguous provision
barring assignment will generally be enforced when included in a participant
agreement.
2. The Ramifications of Valid and Enforceable Anti-assignment Provisions
Courts’ handling of anti-assignment provisions has had significant
consequences for insurers, insureds, and providers.146 This section details
these consequences and highlights why they are critical to the way health
care is delivered to individuals insured through employer-sponsored health
plans.
While insurers capitalize on the advantages of anti-assignment
provisions,147 insureds and providers may suffer negative effects. Perhaps
the most direct impact is that insureds are thrust into a financial intermediary
role between an out-of-network provider and a respective insurer.148 As
previously discussed, an anti-assignment provision renders providers unable
to seek compensation directly from the insurance company on the patient’s
behalf.149 Instead, because the provider is left with no choice but to bill
patients directly, and in full, the responsibility falls on patients to sort out
payment with their insurance companies and to pay providers directly.150 A
patient in this position may have to outlay a potentially hefty sum of money

benefits . . . would be void.”); cf. King v. Cmty. Ins. Co., 829 F. App’x 156, 159–60 (9th Cir.
2020) (allowing assignment despite the inclusion of an anti-assignment clause on the basis
that the anti-assignment language was ambiguous with respect to assignment from the insured
to a provider).
143. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 150 (2009); see Plastic Surgery Ctr.,
P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 228 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[A]s a matter of federal
common law, we recently joined our sister circuits in holding that anti-assignment provisions,
like other unambiguous terms in a contract, are enforceable.”).
144. See LeTourneau Lifelike Orthotics & Prosthetics, 298 F.3d at 352 (“Our case law
affirms . . . ‘Congress’s intent that employers remain free to create, modify and terminate the
terms and conditions of employee benefits plans without governmental interference.’”
(quoting McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1991))); see also City of
Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. HealthPlus, Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 229 (1st Cir. 1998).
145. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 449. See infra notes 323–27 for a discussion of
bargaining power with respect to contractual terms of employee health plans.
146. See infra Part II.A.2.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 134–38.
148. See supra text accompanying note 85.
149. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 91–92; see supra text accompanying note 125.
150. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 91–92.
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before receiving reimbursement from the insurer, if reimbursement comes at
all.151
And while this may be an unpleasant experience for patients themselves,
providers are the ones who could end up feeling the brunt of the problem.152
First, as noted above, the lack of assignment results in the patient receiving
payment from the insurer instead of the provider receiving that payment.153
There exists the possibility that even if the patient does receive adequate
payment from the insurer, that payment may not be conveyed to the provider,
forcing the provider to decide between suing the patient and simply accepting
the situation.154
Further, should the process of receiving payment from the patient go awry
due to an issue with the insurer, an anti-assignment clause deprives the
provider of standing to sue the insurer under ERISA.155 As explained above,
a cause of action under section 502(a) exists only for a participant or
beneficiary of an employee welfare plan.156 Accordingly, whereas a medical
provider has typically been able to seek enforcement of an out-of-network
patient’s insurance plan’s terms against the insurer by way of assignment
from the patient,157 a valid and enforceable anti-assignment provision
prohibits a provider from doing so.158 Instead, anti-assignment provisions
have effectively stripped out-of-network medical providers of standing via
assignment, creating “a considerable hurdle in establishing the right to
demand or contest payment from health insurance companies.”159
Moreover, ERISA’s “extremely strong . . . preemption doctrine”
exacerbates the significance of anti-assignment provisions, as ERISA largely
eliminates the availability of alternative remedies in state court for parties
aggrieved in relation to an employee welfare benefit plan.160 Where an antiassignment provision is in effect, a provider with a grievance over payment
from an insurer, or lack thereof, is left with “only one option: Sue the patient,
hoping that the patient either is willing or able to pay significant, unexpected
costs or has the interest and wherewithal to file suit against the insurer under
section 502(a).”161 Potentially detrimental results for a provider facing such
151. Id.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 155–62.
153. See supra notes 85, 127 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., King v. Cmty. Ins. Co., 829 F. App’x 156, 157–58 (9th Cir. 2020).
155. Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 38.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 31–36.
157. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
158. See Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citing N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc. 801 F.3d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 2015)) (“Absent
the assignment of benefits, a healthcare provider may not pursue its own section 502(a) cause
of action . . . .”).
159. Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 38; see Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 228–29.
160. See Pathak, supra note 21, at 108–09 (“[Section 502] represent[s] the only way . . .
[to] obtain judicial remedies for violations of ERISA. And because ERISA has such a wide
scope . . . [§ 502(a)] provide[s] the only means . . . to seek redress for most of the wrongs . . .
suffered in the context of employer sponsored health care.”).
161. Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 238. Unfortunately, “the prospect of suing patients
to eventually recover from their insurers is unpalatable, to say the least, from a reputational
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a scenario include lost revenues, increased debt, and collection expenses,
exacerbating the current trend of medical practices’ decline in revenue.162
To illustrate the concepts outlined above, we return to Plastic Surgery
Center—where a plaintiff received facial reanimation surgery from an outof-network provider because no in-network provider could perform the
procedure.163 Despite Aetna’s agreement with the provider, before the
surgery, to pay a “reasonable amount” and to do so at the highest amount that
an in-network provider would receive, Aetna paid only $40,230.32 of the
$420,750 billed by the provider.164 Though the provider was able to move
forward on claims of breach of contract and promissory estoppel,165 ERISA’s
preemption provisions prohibited the provider’s claim for unjust enrichment
due to “an impermissible ‘reference to’ the ERISA plan[].”166 Further,
regardless of the preemption pertaining to the state law contract claims, the
provider would have been unable to bring suit under ERISA’s remedial
provision due to a lack of standing because the patient’s agreement with
Aetna contained an anti-assignment provision.167
As outlined above, the effects of anti-assignment provisions are
significant: providers cannot assert a patient’s insurance plan’s terms
directly against the insurer and pursuing litigation is problematic due to
ERISA’s broad preemption and standing requirement, which out-of-network
providers cannot meet due to anti-assignment provisions. While providers
are the direct recipients of these litigation-related detriments, they may also
indirectly burden insureds in employer-sponsored health plans.168 Part II.B
explores arguments around whether these effects are incompatible with
ERISA’s intended protections of those enrolled in such employee benefit
plans.
B. Is Congressional Intervention Warranted?
Though courts have been unwavering in their stance regarding antiassignment provisions, the implication of these provisions warrant further
assessment to determine whether federal legislation or other action is called
for. More precisely, the question is whether ERISA fails to promote the
interests of employees and beneficiaries, as intended, where anti-assignment
provisions are concerned, and, if so, whether ERISA should be amended or
other legislation enacted.
and business development standpoint, not to mention the damage it would cause to the doctorpatient relationship.” Id. at 239.
162. See Yusaf, supra note 4, at 92.
163. Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 240.
164. Id. at 224 (noting that “Aetna declined to pay the [out-of-network provider] anything
for some services and paid less than it allegedly agreed to for others”).
165. Id. at 230. For a discussion of state contract law claims as an alternative remedy, see
Parts II.B.3, III.B.2.
166. Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 240; see supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
167. See Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 228–29; see supra text accompanying notes 31–
36, 132, 138.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 200–03.
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Two opposing perspectives can be deduced from relevant case law and
legal scholarship. The following section outlines the plausible arguments
from each side. Part II.B.1 describes these conflicting views through the lens
of ERISA’s text. Part II.B.2 reviews perspectives on whether the impacts of
anti-assignment provisions comport with, or run contrary to, ERISA’s stated
purpose. Part II.B.3 examines arguments as to whether adequate judicial
remedies and state legislative efforts currently exist rendering federal
intervention unnecessary.
1. Arguments Based on ERISA’s Text
“It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that, ‘unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.’”169 This cardinal principle of statutory
interpretation, however, proves problematic in the context of ERISA and its
provisions governing the right to assignment.170 While ERISA’s text is
unequivocally clear on the list of parties that can bring a claim under its
remedial provision,171 in the welfare benefit plan context, the assignment
question is far less clear.172 While section 206(d)173 expressly bars the
assignment of benefits for pension benefit plans specifically,174 the welfare
benefit plan provisions contain no such mandate—instead, they are silent on
the matter.175 This silence directs an interpreter of the statute toward the
principle of meaningful exclusion,176 which lends support to two competing
views: the idea that ERISA has no view on assignment and the view that the
text supports free assignment.
Much of the interpretive debate on this omission draws on Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.177 There, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted:
169. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2014) (quoting Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
170. See infra text accompanying notes 171–76. See generally Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) (discussing the absence of language
regarding assignment for welfare benefit plans).
171. See City of Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. HealthPlus, Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 1998)
(“Thus, when we previously considered ERISA’s standing provision, we stated that ‘since
Congress has carefully catalogued a selected list of persons eligible to sue under ERISA, there
is no plausible rationale for us gratuitously to enlarge the roster.’” (quoting Kwatcher v. Mass.
Serv. Emps. Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 965 (1st Cir. 1989))); see also supra text
accompanying notes 33–36.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 173–76.
173. ERISA section 206(d) is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
174. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836. Pension benefit plans, distinct from employee welfare
benefit plans, are also governed by separate provisions of ERISA. See supra text
accompanying notes 18–20.
175. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836.
176. “Meaningful exclusion” refers to the general presumption that Congress acts
“intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion” of “particular language in one section
of a statute” that is omitted in another section of that statute. Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
177. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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[T]here is no ignoring the fact that . . . [Congress] had before it a provision
to bar the [assignment] of ERISA plan benefits, and chose to impose that
limitation only with respect to ERISA pension benefit plans . . . . In a
comprehensive regulatory scheme like ERISA, such omissions are
significant ones.178

The generally accepted takeaway from Congress’s lack of express
instructions with respect to welfare benefit plan assignment is implicit
approval of then existing practices.179 Yet, just what those practices were is
far from settled.180 In other words, Congress passively endorsed the status
quo by not expressly speaking on the matter but was not necessarily clear as
to what that status quo exactly was.
Read one way, this omission could suggest that general principles of
contract law should control; because assignment is not explicitly mandated,
anti-assignment clauses must be enforceable.181 The Ninth Circuit has said
as much, interpreting Congress’s silence to mean an intention “not to
mandate assignability, but intended instead to allow the free marketplace to
work out such competitive, cost effective, medical expense reducing
structures as might evolve.”182
Another reason to allow the continued practice is that despite “repeated
amendments and a largescale overhaul of the healthcare system,”183
Congress has taken no legislative action to indicate any concern about or
antipathy toward barring assignment, despite the increasingly pervasive
inclusion of anti-assignment provisions in participant agreements.184
However, the absence of an express bar on assignability is not necessarily
dispositive that Congress had no intent on the matter. For one thing, ERISA’s
text is to be construed in a manner consistent with the intent of the legislation,
and mandated assignment could have significant positive benefits for

178. Id. at 837.
179. See, e.g., id. at 837–38 (“Once Congress was sufficiently aware of the prospect that
ERISA plan benefits could be attached and/or garnished—as evidenced by its adoption of
§ 206(d)(1)—Congress’ decision to remain silent concerning the attachment or garnishment
of ERISA welfare plan benefits ‘acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather than
prohibiting it.’” (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos–Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 516 (1981))).
180. Compare Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d
445, 451 (3d Cir. 2018) (identifying the “fairly ubiquitous” assignment of benefits as the status
quo), with Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1480–81 (9th Cir.
1991) (identifying the traditional norm as permitting use of business competitive mechanisms
like anti-assignment provisions).
181. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 450; cf. St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Kan., Inc., 49 F.3d 1460, 1464 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding, based on the Court’s
reasoning in Mackey, that “Congress did not intend to enact a policy precluding [welfare plan
benefits] assignability”).
182. Davidowitz, 946 F.2d at 1480–81.
183. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 450.
184. See id.; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–01 (1983)
(“Nonaction by Congress is not often a useful guide, but . . . . [i]n view of [Congress’s]
prolonged and acute awareness of so important an issue, [its] failure to act . . . provides added
support for concluding that Congress acquiesced.”).
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participants and beneficiaries.185 Thus, it is conceivable that ERISA should
actually be read to mandate the permissibility of assignment.
Additionally, it is plausible that silence suggests implicit approval of the
status quo—one in which the market, which has been characterized by “fairly
ubiquitous” assignment of plan benefits for some time, is allowed to play out
as players see fit.186 Accordingly, Congress’s “silence does not necessarily
mean [it] intended to permit plan trustees to extinguish” the right to assign
benefits “through a blanket contractual waiver.”187 It could, in fact, mean
the opposite—leaving out a prohibition on assignment for welfare plans,
unlike pension plans, meant that Congress actually wanted such rights to be
freely assignable.188
2. Arguments Based on Congress’s Intent in Enacting ERISA
Moving beyond the statutory text, legislative intent may also help shed
light on whether the promulgation of anti-assignment provisions in health
plans violates ERISA’s intended protections of employees and their
beneficiaries participating in benefit plans. To use legislative intent “is to
construe the language [of a statute] so as to give effect to the intent of
Congress.”189 Assessing the impact of anti-assignment provisions in the
context of congressional intent requires no difficult deduction or mind
reading; desire to “promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries” is clearly stated in the text.190 One prudent way to evaluate
whether this intent is effectuated in the health plan context is to determine
whether anti-assignment provisions promote or restrict access to health
care.191
Proponents of anti-assignment clauses purport that the clauses further
ERISA’s intentions, especially from a financial perspective.192 As antiassignment provisions induce providers to come in network and help control
185. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 451–52; see infra text accompanying notes 282–83.
186. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 451.
187. Id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 186–87.
189. John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397,
2404 (2017) (citing United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940)). Beyond
the text, legislative history around the statute’s enactment, such as floor debates, may be used
to determine intent. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 429 (1989).
190. See supra note 30. This Note proceeds under the normative determination that the
legislative intent behind ERISA is clear and obvious, based on the text, such that the legislative
history and other interpretative sources need not be consulted to deduce it. This follows the
view that “judicial efforts to impeach a clear text through . . . ‘nontextual sources’ will yield
only ‘conjectural’ benefits (in terms of further accuracy) along with [significant] costs (in
terms of searching and processing extrinsic sources). Hence, judges should forgo reliance on
such sources and stick to the surface meaning of the text.” Manning, supra note 189, at 2429
(footnote omitted) (quoting ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 115, 186,
189–90 (2006)).
191. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 451 (citing CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 751
F.3d 165, 179 (3d Cir. 2014)).
192. Id. at 452.
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costs,193 they allow insurers to charge lower premiums than would otherwise
be possible.194 Under this view, anti-assignment provisions promote an
individual’s access to care because less costly health insurance coverage is
more readily obtainable which, in turn, makes the same true for obtaining
health care services as needed.195 Although providers’ interests may not be
promoted as a result of barring assignment,196 such impacts are not relevant
to the debate, as ERISA was enacted to protect the interests of individuals
insured by employer-sponsored plans, not the providers.197
On the other hand, those who challenge the pervasive use of antiassignment clauses emphasize that they are, in some ways, directly
counterproductive to Congress’s intent in enacting ERISA because they limit
consumer choice.198 Under this view, though harm incurred by a provider is
not necessarily directly relevant to the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries, it is plausible to say that the effects on providers actually lead
to a hesitance to serve out-of-network patients and, in some cases, a decision
not to do so.199
The concerns of treating out-of-network patients begin with the cost and
administrative headaches associated with out-of-network care.200 These
issues are exacerbated by anti-assignment clauses because the provider’s
only remedy, if and when payment becomes problematic, is a suit against the
patient directly—“a proposition that is both expensive and bad for
business.”201
As a result, access to health care for those participating in employersponsored health plans is limited because insureds needing out-of-network
care face limited options.202 Where this burden disincentivizes providers
from rendering care to out-of-network patients in some or all instances, the
impacts are clearly against congressional intent, as this directly contradicts
the argument that anti-assignment provisions serve “participants’
interests . . . by ‘increasing their access to care.’”203
193. See supra text accompanying notes 84–86.
194. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1348–49 (8th
Cir. 1991).
195. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 452.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 199–201.
197. See supra text accompanying note 30; cf. McCulloch Orthopaedic Surgical Servs.,
PLLC v. Aetna Inc., 857 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[B]ecause [the out-of-network
provider] is not a valid assignee and has no plan-related relationship with [the insurer], the
benefits under the health care plan belong to the patient, not to [the out-of-network
provider].”).
198. See, e.g., Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 449; cf. Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Emps. Health &
Welfare Tr., 789 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986) (asserting that assignability protects insureds
“by making it unnecessary for health care providers to evaluate the solvency of patients before
commencing medical treatment, and by eliminating the necessity for [insureds] to pay
potentially large medical bills and await compensation from the plan”).
199. See McCulloch, 857 F.3d at 148.
200. See Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 37.
201. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 451.
202. McCulloch, 857 F.3d at 148.
203. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 451 (quoting CardioNet v. Cigna Health Corp., 751 F.3d
165, 179 (3d Cir. 2014)); see also Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d
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Additionally, providers’ failure to capture revenues due to anti-assignment
provisions can infringe on the opportunities to update their practices with the
latest technology and innovative methods.204 Again, this would not promote
the interests of employees in such plans who would not be getting the best
possible medical care and suggests that anti-assignment provisions may run
against congressional intent.
3. Arguments Based on Existing Judicial Remedies and State Legislative
Protections
Looking beyond ERISA’s text and purpose, the question of whether
federal intervention—a legislative amendment by Congress205—is necessary
depends, in part, on whether alternative judicial remedies and existing state
legislative efforts are sufficient to address the effect of anti-assignment
provisions.
In response to the increasing prevalence of anti-assignment provisions in
their out-of-network patients’ health plans, and with ERISA’s preemption
precluding plan-related suits, many providers “have attempted to secure a
new foothold” by proactively seeking promise of payment from the insurers
before rendering services.206 Put differently, when an out-of-network patient
seeks nonemergency care from a provider, a member of that provider’s staff
will seek to reach an ad hoc agreement with the patient’s insurance company
outlining specific compensation for the respective treatment.207 The
remedial implication is clear: should the insurer not comply with the
agreement—for example, underpay or not pay at all—contract common-law
causes of action, like breach of contract and promissory estoppel, may suffice
as an adequate alternative to a section 502(a) suit, which would be
unavailable to the provider due to the anti-assignment provision.208
Importantly, these state law causes of action predicated on the separate ad
hoc arrangement between the provider and insurer could not be brought under
section 502(a) because the insurer’s alleged liability would flow from that
independent agreement, as opposed to the patient’s insurance plan.209
Further, where an ad hoc agreement of this nature is the basis of the
provider’s claim, no preemption issue arises because the claims do not “relate
236, 247 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[D]iscouraging health care providers from becoming assignees
would ‘undermine Congress’ goal of enhancing employees’ health and welfare benefit
coverage.’” (quoting Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289
n.13 (5th Cir. 1988))).
204. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 92–93.
205. See infra Part III.A.
206. Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 229 (3d Cir. 2020).
207. Id. at 228.
208. Id. at 229.
209. Id.; see also McCulloch Orthopaedic Surgical Servs., PLLC v. Aetna Inc., 857 F.3d
141, 149 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[The out-of-network provider’s] promissory-estoppel claim does
not depend on the specific terms of the relevant health care plan or on [the insurer’s]
determination of coverage or benefits pursuant to those terms.”). This rationale was invoked
by the courts in Plastic Surgery Center and McCulloch—the example cases detailed in Parts
II.A.2 and I.B.2, respectively.
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to” an ERISA plan210 but rather an independent contractual agreement with
obligations unrelated to an ERISA-governed plan.211
The U.S. Department of Labor212 (DOL) has advocated this position,
emphasizing the “overwhelming and persuasive consensus” among courts
that disputes pertaining to these ad hoc contracts are not preempted by
ERISA.213 Accordingly, in theory, out-of-network providers can sufficiently
protect themselves from the negative impacts of anti-assignment clauses by
proactively establishing such agreements. Additionally, where necessary,
providers can enforce the terms of the agreements through contract law,
rather than ERISA’s remedial provision.214
However, while contract common-law causes of action provide a feasible
avenue of relief in some scenarios, a number of issues can still arise that make
this approach an inadequate solution.215 For instance, some state law claims
may invite preemption issues;216 contractual agreements are not feasible in
all scenarios;217 and even if such agreements can be formed, use of contract
law in the context of employer-sponsored health insurance arguably defies
ERISA’s intentions regarding uniform federal regulation.218
First, as to preemption, though courts often allow such state law claims to
proceed,219 sometimes the payment terms of these ad hoc arrangements may
default to rates of payment outlined in the respective patient’s ERISAgoverned plan, bringing the claim back under ERISA’s preemption
umbrella.220 This primarily results because, “[a]s out-of-network providers
migrate from accepting assignment of plan benefits from the insured to
forming their own agreements with the insurers, many have not yet
developed a standard form of contract.”221 This can bring about the very
preemption issues that the contracts seek to avoid because defaulting to an
ERISA-governed plan creates an impermissible “reference to” that plan.222
Additionally, as previously discussed, though claims for breach of contract
210. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
211. Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 229, 236 (highlighting courts of appeals’
“overwhelming” view that common-law contract claims, like breach of contract and
promissory estoppel, pleaded by out-of-network providers against insurers, “are not expressly
preempted because . . . they arise out of a relationship ERISA did not intend to govern at all”).
212. The DOL is responsible for setting rules governing certain health insurance plans
provided by employers and unions, which are enforced under ERISA. See KONGSTVEDT, supra
note 22, at 240, 247.
213. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at
18, 23, McCulloch Orthopaedic Surgical Servs., PLLC v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., No. 152144 (2d Cir. Oct. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for the Secretary of Labor]. This is because
“the relationship between the healthcare providers with the insurer is a separate relationship
with independent duties from the one between the insurer and the plan participants.” Id. at 25.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 206–13.
215. See infra text accompanying notes 216–18.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 220–24.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 225–26.
218. See infra text accompanying note 228.
219. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
220. Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 229 (3d Cir. 2020).
221. Id.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50, 165–66.
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and promissory estoppel may proceed,223 claims for unjust enrichment are
preempted because the respective “benefit conferred” is premised on the
existence of an ERISA plan, stripping the provider of one typical contractrelated remedy.224
While use of contract claims has proven to be an effective remedy in some
scenarios, it falls short in others. For instance, the myriad ways in which outof-network care may be necessitated renders it difficult to always reach such
agreements ahead of time.225 As discussed above, oftentimes out-of-network
care is rendered on an emergency basis and, in such scenarios, providers
cannot be expected to confirm with a critically sick or injured patient’s
insurance company whether services will be covered, and if so, how much
will be paid.226
Further, state contract law is inherently disjointed, as the applicable rules
vary across jurisdictions.227 To use state law as a relief mechanism related
to welfare benefit plans seemingly runs directly contrary to Congress’s intent
that ERISA disputes be governed under uniform legislation and solely be a
matter of federal concern.228
Beyond these potentially available judicial remedies, state legislatures,
acting in their insurance regulator capacity,229 have regularly attempted to
protect health care consumers,230 including from some of the effects
associated with anti-assignment provisions. Whether these efforts are
sufficient alternatives to federal legislative action is a debate with support on
both sides.231
Specifically targeting anti-assignment provisions, a number of states have
enacted mandatory assignment of benefits laws.232 Under a mandatory
assignment of benefits regime, an insurer has no choice but to honor an
assignment made by an insured to a provider and to pay the provider
directly.233 These laws may either cover all services, as enacted in a few
jurisdictions,234 or more commonly, only emergency medical services.235

223. See supra text accompanying notes 208–11.
224. Plastic Surgery Ctr., 967 F.3d at 240.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 88, 94–97.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 188 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“The rights
and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction . . . .”).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 38–42. But see infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the
plausible perspective that the duties established in such ad hoc arrangements are distinct from
the ERISA-governed plan terms).
229. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
230. See Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 183; Yusaf, supra note 4, at 114.
231. See infra Part II.B.3.
232. See Yusaf, supra note 4, at 114–19 (describing mandated assignment of benefits laws
in Colorado and Florida).
233. See id. at 115.
234. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-120(a) (2021).
235. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.4(a)–(d) (West 2021).
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Network adequacy laws employed by a number of states are another reason
why intervention may be unnecessary.236 As provider networks have
continually narrowed in recent years,237 many states have responded by
establishing insurance regulations that require networks to be stronger and
broader.238 This feasibly reduces the need for out-of-network care, thus
minimizing the relevance of anti-assignment clauses.
“Any willing provider laws” adopted by state legislatures also have an
indirect effect on anti-assignment provisions.239 These laws require that
insurers accept into their provider networks any and all providers that meet a
stated set of criteria as long as the provider agrees to the insurer’s contractual
terms governing provider participation.240 In theory, similar to network
adequacy laws, any willing provider laws create sufficiently robust networks
where an insured will not need out-of-network care.241
However, moving to the contrary view, while “states’ powers to regulate
their health care systems are historic and expansive,”242 these powers, as they
relate to employee health plans, are tapered by ERISA’s preemption, as
discussed in Part I.A above.243 ERISA has “erected a notorious obstacle to
state regulation of health insurance,”244 as express preemption makes
substantive patient financial protections legislated by states “inapplicable for
a large proportion of consumers who get their health insurance from
employer-based plans.”245
Further, section 502 completely preempts state legislative remedies
pertaining to all ERISA health plans.246 As a result, any detrimental impacts
arising due to anti-assignment provisions generally cannot be remedied
236. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 144–45 (“Network adequacy refers to a health plan’s
ability to provide enrollees with timely and reasonable access to a sufficient number of innetwork primary care and specialty physicians and other health care services included under
the terms of the contract.”).
237. See Reed Abelson, More Insured, but the Choices Are Narrowing, N.Y. TIMES (May
12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/business/more-insured-but-the-choices-arenarrowing.html [https://perma.cc/ERC3-YPE5].
238. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 237 (“Most states have network adequacy laws
requiring [managed care organizations] to have sufficient healthcare providers available for
enrollees.”).
239. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-270 (West 2021) (“A health insurer shall
not discriminate against any provider who is located within the geographic coverage area of
the health benefit plan and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation
established by the health insurer . . . .”).
240. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 45.
241. See supra Part I.B.2.
242. Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 26, at 415.
243. See infra Part I.A.
244. Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 26, at 415; see supra Part I.A (explaining the
impact of ERISA’s preemptive powers on the ability of states to regulate employee health
plans).
245. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 183; see id. at 156 (“[T]o the extent they regulate health
plans, state laws on network adequacy or surprise billing are subject to preemption by
ERISA. . . . [I]n practical terms, many of these emerging state consumer protections are
simply inapplicable and unavailable if the consumer is one of the millions insured by an
employer-based health plan, particularly a self-funded plan.”).
246. Id. at 189.
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through a state consumer protection law or state law cause of action.247 For
example, multiple federal courts of appeals have found that mandatory
assignment of benefits laws enacted by state legislatures are preempted by
ERISA, meaning they are inapplicable for employer-sponsored health plan
participants and beneficiaries.248
Setting aside the view that state laws are ineffective because of
preemption, it is also plausible to see these state legislative efforts as
insufficient because some individuals will still inevitably receive out-ofnetwork care on an involuntary or accidental basis.249 Additionally, even the
most conscientious individuals may find themselves in a challenging
situation while attempting to determine which provider to visit because “the
lack of disclosure or network transparency makes it difficult or impossible
for a patient to avoid out-of-network providers.”250
III. CALLING ON CONGRESS FOR A DELIBERATE REVIEW OF ANTIASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS
Undoubtedly, anti-assignment provisions are a tiny piece of a broken
healthcare puzzle that has plagued contemporary American society. While
there are surely countless ways to improve the existing healthcare system,
this Note focuses on determining what steps the federal government should
take, if any, to address anti-assignment provisions in light of ERISA’s
intended protections. In that realm, this Note argues that, based on the
existence of alarming anecdotal evidence that anti-assignment provisions
may operate to the detriment of employees and their beneficiaries, Congress
should conduct an in-depth empirical examination of this problem. This Note
does not speculate on what that empirical evidence, developed as part of these
efforts, will reveal. Instead, this Note outlines plausible ERISA amendments
should that empirical research indicate a need for intervention, as well as
interim solutions that could minimize ongoing adverse effects.
The impacts of anti-assignment provisions on out-of-network providers
and insurers, as detailed in Part II.A.2, demonstrate the provisions’
unequivocal significance.251 Most notably, anti-assignment provisions have
essentially stripped health care providers of the opportunity to enforce terms
directly against an insurer and to bring suit directly against the insurance
companies when payment issues arise.252 As discussed above, not only does
this impact the provider but that provider’s burden can impact the ability of

247. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
248. Compare Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341 (8th
Cir. 1991) (finding mandated assignment to be preempted by ERISA), and St. Francis Reg’l
Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 49 F.3d 1460 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding
the same), with La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., 461 F.3d 529 (5th
Cir. 2006) (finding that a similar statute is not preempted).
249. See supra Part I.B.2.
250. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 139.
251. See supra Part II.A.2.
252. See supra Part II.A.2.
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an insured to receive out-of-network care.253 This issue is particularly
pronounced in the context of ERISA, federal legislation seemingly designed
to protect against such detriments.254
However, the simple fact that these provisions may be problematic does
not necessarily command federal intervention. Instead, this Note proposes a
deliberate congressional review in pursuit of comprehensive empirical
evidence to help determine whether the impact of anti-assignment provisions
on employees and their beneficiaries warrant action. Part III.A identifies
immediate steps that Congress could take to better understand the effects of
anti-assignment provisions in the context of ERISA’s stated purpose and why
this assessment is important. Part III.B suggests possible long-term changes
to ERISA that may be warranted depending on the investigatory results.
However, just because Congress must first take action to understand the issue
does not mean changes cannot be made in the short term. Part III.C identifies
interim solutions that could be utilized while Congress takes up this research
endeavor, including utilizing power of attorney, establishing standard form
contractual agreements for specialized out-of-network care, and encouraging
employers to negotiate health plans for employees that do not include antiassignment provisions.
A. Why Congressional Study Is Needed
Before approaching the question of whether Congress should take action,
it is critical to understand why Congress is the most reasonable and logical
actor, as suggested by this Note, to effectuate any needed change. The
rationale has three components.
First, ERISA, the relevant law that has created many of these issues in the
first place because of its standing requirement255 and preemption power,256
is a federal law.257 Accordingly, Congress is tasked with proposing and
passing any related amendments or new legislation.258 Further, Congress has
been recognized as having the institutional competence to study and act on
important policy issues such as the one described by this Note.259 As Justice
Breyer has noted, “[w]here a legislature has significantly greater institutional
expertise . . . the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative
judgments.”260 This is because “Congress is far better positioned to gather

253. See supra text accompanying notes 200–03.
254. See supra Part I.A.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 39–46.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18, 22.
258. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8. See generally Enactment of a Law, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/help/learn-about-the-legislative-process/enactment-of-a-law
[https://perma.cc/3F68-64RW] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
259. See infra text accompanying notes 260–61.
260. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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data, solicit and respond to the views of its constituents, and craft a solution
that takes such policy considerations into account.”261
Second, as discussed in Part II.A.2, federal courts have consistently and
unequivocally held that unambiguous, private, and freely negotiated antiassignment provisions are enforceable and not void as contrary to public
policy, and there is no indication that the Supreme Court will act to the
contrary.262
Third, while ERISA could be modified through executive branch action—
by DOL rulemaking263—as opposed to congressional action, a closer look
demonstrates that the latter is the more effective option.264 DOL’s
substantive authority to regulate aspects of employee health plans—
including network adequacy, transparency, and consumer financial
protection—is established in large part by the Affordable Care Act—a bill
that has come under judicial and political scrutiny.265
Because ERISA’s text, the critical starting point, does not immediately
make clear that such intervention is warranted,266 determining this question
depends on policy arguments about whether the reality of the current
situation aligns with ERISA’s stated purpose of promoting the interest of
those insured in employer-sponsored health plans.267 The sound and
persuasive arguments opposing anti-assignment provisions, outlined
throughout Part II.B, demonstrate an unavoidable plausibility that federal
intervention may be warranted. However, the position that anti-assignment
clauses actually benefit individuals in accessing affordable health care is “a
proposition accepted by a variety of federal and state courts.”268
Critically, the lack of a clearly correct answer to the situation is
exacerbated by a notable failure of those contesting anti-assignment
provisions to provide empirical evidence that supports the need for action.
Policy arguments presented to courts have instead been predicated on
generalities and merely anecdotal evidence,269 which is helpful, yet only goes
261. Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445, 452
(3d Cir. 2018).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 142–44; cf. William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (“Congress
frequently overrides or modifies statutory decisions by lower federal courts as well as those
by the Supreme Court.”); Gregory Koger, How a Democratic Congress Can Push Back
Against the Supreme Court, VOX:
MISCHIEFS OF FACTION (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2018/11/12/18080622/democratic-congressagainst-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/BJV4-TPY4] (“Congress, however, can diminish the
effect of . . . judicial policymaking by actually passing laws on several fronts . . . .”).
263. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 194–97; see supra note 212.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 255–61.
265. Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 196–97.
266. See Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 451 (“In short, the text of ERISA . . . is inconclusive
on the question we address today.”); supra Part II.B.1.
267. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 451 (“Because ERISA does not clearly prohibit antiassignment clauses, we confront a statutory gap yet to be filled . . . . To do so, we ‘look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’” (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987))).
268. Id. at 452.
269. See id. (“Yet . . . neither party cites to authoritative empirical data.”).
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so far. Judge Cheryl Ann Krause of the Third Circuit emphasized this view,
noting that “the parties’ respective policy arguments are only as persuasive
as the empirical data that support them.”270 Instead, however, sides
advocating the conflicting positions “would have us deduce whether antiassignment clauses promote or impede the goals of ERISA on the basis of
their dueling economic arguments and without pointing us to any
congressional findings or hearings on the subject.”271
Contrary to the approach of those parties, any proposal to amend ERISA
must be preceded by congressional facilitation of empirical data
development, which would validate or invalidate the need for action. In
undertaking this research endeavor, Congress should develop comprehensive
empirical data that compares health care services in employer-sponsored
health plans with anti-assignment provisions and those without such
provisions.
More specifically, Congress should establish and investigate metrics that
measure access to health care, with a focus on financial ramifications. As
previously discussed, this is an indicator accepted by numerous courts as
determinative of whether anti-assignment provisions achieve ERISA’s
intended purpose.272 These research efforts could be achieved by drawing
heavily on the DOL’s authorization to promulgate rules and regulations
requiring ERISA-governed health plans to submit certain data about health
care claims.273
Potential metrics to consider assessing include, but are not limited to: (1)
the average cost that an insured incurs when receiving out-of-network care
where the insured’s plan includes an anti-assignment provision; (2) the
difference between the average amount advanced to the provider and the
amount reimbursed by the insurer; (3) the frequency with which antiassignment provisions result in unanticipated medical bills for insureds
seeking out-of-network care; (4) the average amount of such bills; and (5)
the difficulty, if any, for an insured with an anti-assignment provision in a
health plan to obtain out-of-network care.
Even if anecdotal evidence unequivocally demonstrated the need for
remedial action, empirical evidence would still likely be needed to succeed
in the legislative process. Designing and executing a legislative solution is
not a simple task given the extremely difficult process required to turn
proposed legislation into actual law.274 Further, there is no reason to think
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 451; see also supra text accompanying notes 191, 268.
273. “[This] statutory authority . . . is derived from Public Health Service Act (PHSA)
section 2715A, which authorizes collection of data on health care costs and payments, and
section 2717, which authorizes collection of data on health care quality.” Fuse Brown, supra
note 1, at 196.
274. See generally Andrew Rudalevige, Why Does Congress Have Such a Hard Time
Passing Laws?: Let’s Blame the Constitution., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 11, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/11/why-does-congresshave-such-a-hard-time-passing-laws-lets-blame-the-constitution
[https://perma.cc/HHV72CHU].
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sweeping changes to ERISA are feasible in the near term given that
Congress’s recent effectiveness at passing legislation has been historically
subpar.275 Congressional findings developed through hearings and other
research tools may help the likelihood of bipartisan success on a legislative
amendment pertaining to healthcare, one of the most hot button areas of
policy today.276
B. Options for Potential ERISA Amendments in the Long Term
While this Note does not presuppose that Congress will find compelling
evidence that ERISA needs to be amended, or even that anti-assignment
provisions are detrimental to our healthcare system, there are several steps
Congress could take should it find empirical evidence demonstrating that
anti-assignment provisions are, in fact, damaging. Depending on the
outcome of the research inquiry, a number of options stand out as potentially
optimal paths forward if a long-term amendment is a prudent course of
action. Part III.B proposes three revisionary options Congress could pursue
and explores the strengths and weaknesses of each option. Part III.B.1
outlines mandatory assignment of benefits. Part III.B.2 highlights the
possibility of tapering ERISA’s broad preemption. Part III.B.3 explains the
potential for allowing statutory standing for providers.
1. Mandatory Assignment of Benefits
The most obvious approach to amending ERISA in this context is a fairly
simple one: mandating the right to assign the benefits that individuals are
entitled to under employee welfare benefit plans. Though this may seem
relatively innocuous on the surface, it is anything but. To the contrary, there
could, and likely would, be a significant risk of sharp increases in insurance
premiums because, as previously discussed, insurers have used antiassignment clauses as a way to induce providers to come in network and
control costs.277 If assignment is mandated, providers likely would have less
incentive to come in network and insurers would be susceptible to unforeseen
rates charged by out-of-network providers.278
However, mandatory assignment of benefits laws are not unheard of—
rather, they have been enacted on the state level in regulating non-ERISAgoverned health plans.279 Accordingly, if Congress found evidence, as part
of its larger studies of anti-assignment provisions, that state laws mandating
275. See generally Derek Willis & Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working,
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stoppedworking [https://perma.cc/3AA4-FDHJ].
276. See Election 2020: Voters Are Highly Engaged, but Nearly Half Expect to Have
Difficulties Voting, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org
/politics/2020/08/13/important-issues-in-the-2020-election [https://perma.cc/LRA3-QCVH]
(identifying health care as the second highest topic considered “very important” by registered
voters ahead of the 2020 election).
277. See supra text accompanying note 135.
278. See supra text accompanying note 193.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 234–35.
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assignment of benefits did not lead to a hike in premiums, a federal
adaptation of such an approach could be a feasible option. Additionally,
advocates against anti-assignment provisions persuasively contend that
mandating assignment is not as drastic as it may seem at first. For example,
a spokeswoman for the Florida Medical Association explained that “the law
would merely ‘change the address on the [reimbursement] check,’ meaning
that instead of going to a patient, the check would be going to the
physicians.”280
Moreover, despite resistance from insurers, a study conducted on
mandating assignment has demonstrated that “insurance companies would
continue to earn substantial profits even if such an assignment mandate were
in place.”281 Most importantly, effective mandatory assignment of benefits
laws could lower the likelihood of an insured in an employer-sponsored
health plan becoming a victim of balance billing,282 thus furthering ERISA’s
intended protections.283
2. Tapering the Breadth of ERISA’s Preemption
An alternative approach is to amend ERISA’s text by tapering the breadth
of its preemption powers. As discussed above, sections 502(a) and 514(a)
both work to expressly displace state laws that impact employee welfare
benefit plans, including health plans.284 This preemption leaves state law
that seeks to protect consumers of health care ineffective for those enrolled
in ERISA-governed plans.285 To taper ERISA’s preemption would instead
allow state legislatures to evaluate and implement the optimal governance for
their constituencies.286
Congress could amend the aforementioned sections of ERISA to reflect an
intent of conflict preemption, instead of the existing express preemption.287
Under conflict preemption, “preemption occurs [only] when compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . or when state
law poses an ‘obstacle’ to the accomplishment of the ‘full purposes and
objectives’ of Congress.”288 This change could help achieve promotion of
280. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 118–19 (quoting Brandon Larrabee, New Law Allows Out-ofNetwork Doctors to Be Paid Directly by Insurance Companies, JACKSONVILLE.COM (June 11,
2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.jacksonville.com/article/20090611/NEWS/801233116
[https://perma.cc/9VPQ-N7QC]).
281. Id. at 127.
282. See supra text accompanying note 105.
283. Yusaf, supra note 4, at 126; see supra text accompanying note 108.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47.
285. See Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 194 (“In the context of consumer financial
protection, ERISA preemption excludes from protection a large and growing number of
consumers who[] are insured by self-funded employer health plans.”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 48–52.
286. See Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 26, at 415; see also supra text
accompanying note 50.
287. See supra Part I.A.
288. See SYKES & VANATKO, supra note 40, at 2 (footnote omitted) (first quoting Fla. Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963); and then quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Fuse Brown, supra note 1, at 197 (“Under
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the interest of participants and beneficiaries in employee welfare benefit
plans by allowing state insurance and consumer financial protection laws to
take effect for those in ERISA-related plans.289 Because such state laws
intend to foster and facilitate, rather than conflict with, the stated intentions
of ERISA, they would likely not be preempted under a conflict preemption
scheme.290 For example, whereas currently, some state mandatory
assignment of benefits laws are inapplicable to ERISA-governed plans due
to preemption,291 if these laws were given effect, anti-assignment clauses and
their respective effects would become irrelevant because assignment would
be mandatory.
Though, at first glance, returning the power to regulate a type of employee
benefit plan to the states may seem inapposite to an intended federal “uniform
regulatory regime,”292 ERISA’s legislative history, detailed in Part I.A,
actually suggests Congress was far more concerned with regulating pension
plans than welfare plans, including health plans.293 Thus, it is plausible that
allowing state laws to take effect with respect to a type of welfare plan, as
opposed to a pension plan, does not run contrary to the true core of ERISA’s
original intentions.294
Additionally, a narrower view of preemption does have some basis in
Supreme Court precedent.295 The Court’s approach to ERISA preemption is
to take a narrower view than the broadest feasible interpretation of the fairly
vague statutory text, specifically around ERISA’s preemption powers.296 If
Congress were to transition ERISA’s text to reflect conflict preemption rather
than express preemption, it would merely be moving in the same direction
that the Court has since ERISA’s inception.297
3. Granting Statutory Standing to Out-of-Network Providers
An additional, though less significant, change would be to amend ERISA
to grant statutory standing to providers. Instead of section 502 granting the
right to sue to participants and beneficiaries only, Congress could instead add
out-of-network providers to that list. Under this approach, while insureds
conflict preemption, state laws are only preempted if they conflict with federal law, as opposed
to ERISA’s express preemption scheme which preempts all state laws if they relate to
employee benefit plans, whether or not they conflict with ERISA.”).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 244–45, 286–87.
290. See supra Part I.A.
291. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
292. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).
293. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 24–27.
295. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016); N.Y. State
Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983).
296. See Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 655–56 (“The governing text of [the] ERISA
[preemption clause] is clearly expansive. . . . [But] [i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the
furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never
run its course, for ‘[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere.’” (fifth alteration in original)
(quoting HENRY JAMES, RODERICK HUDSON xli (Oxford Univ. Press 1980))).
297. See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text.
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would still be unable to assign their claims to providers where a valid antiassignment provision exists, a provider could seek legal redress against
insurance companies for nonpayment. Meanwhile, insurers would still
maintain significant existing incentives for providers to come in network.298
In addition to the safety net that being able to bring suit gives to providers,
this model could also help promote uniform regulation because providers
would not be forced into the work-around of suing under claims of disjointed
state law but rather could consistently use ERISA.299
Though the provider would receive the protection of the right to pursue
litigation, the grant of statutory standing could help achieve ERISA’s stated
purpose by actually promoting the interests of the employees enrolled in
employer-sponsored health plans. Employees would likely continue to
benefit financially with respect to their health plan premiums, which would
continue to be low because the providers would still be incentivized to come
in network.300 However, for providers not participating in the network,
treating out-of-network patients would become more palatable because the
out-of-network provider would retain the ability to sue the insurance
company directly should any issues arise.301 Lastly, because providers
would be able to file such suits, patients would incur far less risk of assuming
unknown costs.302
This approach essentially serves as a compromise. The ERISA-governed
insurance market following this amendment would be similar to current antiassignment provisions. Anti-assignment provisions would continue to be
effective and their intentions would be achieved, for the most part, as the
advantages of coming in network would continue to exist.303 However, outof-network providers would simply have an extra layer of protection for the
most egregious situations warranting litigation, such as when insurers
underpay the provider to a severely problematic degree for services rendered.
C. Proposed Interim Solutions to Mitigate Anti-assignment Provisions
As congressional development of findings related to anti-assignment
provisions would not occur overnight, there are interim steps that could
mitigate the existing effects outlined above. Part III.C argues that, until
Congress decides whether amendment of ERISA is warranted—and even for
the long term if no amendment is enacted—ERISA’s purpose will be
furthered by the use of such interim solutions. Part III.C.1 outlines the
possibility of providers using power of attorney to bring legal claims against
insurers on behalf of patients. Part III.C.2 encourages providers to develop
and implement the consistent use of standard form contracts to govern the
298. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 206–08, 228. But see infra Part III.C.2 (discussing
the plausible perspective that the duties established in such ad hoc arrangements are distinct
from the ERISA-governed plan terms).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86, 135–37.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 195, 202–03.
302. See supra text accompanying note 161.
303. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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provision of out-of-network care. Part III.C.3 suggests employers take
initiative to protect their employees by negotiating employee health plans
that do not include anti-assignment provisions.
1. Out-of-Network Provider Use of Power of Attorney
Where an allegedly harmed provider does not have standing to bring a
claim against an insurer due to an anti-assignment provision,304 use of a
power of attorney (POA) may allow the provider to pursue claims on the
insured’s behalf.305 POA is “an instrument in writing by which one person,
as principal, appoints another as his or her agent and confers upon the agent
the authority to perform certain specified acts.”306 POA does not transfer an
ownership interest in a claim,307 as assignment does,308 but rather grants
authority to the agent to act “on behalf of the principal.”309
Though POA is not a common avenue of relief in the anti-assignment
provision context, at least one court of appeals has endorsed the feasibility of
its use, noting that an insured “may confer on his agent the authority to assert
[a] claim on his behalf, and the anti-assignment clause no more has power to
strip [the provider] of its ability to act as [the insured’s] agent than it does to
strip [the insured] of his own interest in his claim.”310 Put differently,
because the claim is not being transferred to another individual, but instead
simply pursued by another party on the original party’s behalf, the antiassignment provision has no impact. If it did, it would amount to completely
barring suit by the insured individual in the first place.
Accordingly, as Congress develops greater insights into anti-assignment
provisions, providers facing litigation-worthy underpayment should, in the
interim, seek to use POA to enforce the terms of out-of-network patients’
insurance plans in court. While this is not a perfect solution because the
provider still does not technically have ownership of the claim and the patient
continues to serve as the financial intermediary, it is likely more effective
than suing the patient to recover lost fees or simply accepting the status quo.
2. Consistent Use of Standard Form Contracts for Specialized Out-ofNetwork Care
As discussed above, one alternative to relying on ERISA-related remedies
for a provider, where possible, is to proactively establish a separate
304. See supra Part I.C; text accompanying notes 158–59.
305. See Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445,
455 (3d Cir. 2018).
306. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 20 (2020) (footnote omitted).
307. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir.
2008).
308. See supra text accompanying note 127.
309. Villanueva Compania Naviera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (In re Complaint of Bankers
Tr. Co.), 752 F.2d 874, 881 (3d Cir. 1984).
310. Am. Orthopedic, 890 F.3d at 455.
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contractual agreement with an insurer before rendering out-of-network
care.311 At first glance, suing under disjointed state contract causes of action
may appear to run contrary to ERISA’s desired uniform governance.
However, a number of courts have found to the contrary.312 The key
distinction is that the relevant obligations in the contract law causes of action
context do not arise from ERISA-governed plans but rather from independent
contractual obligations.313 “In these disputes, the provider is ‘not arguing
about plan terms. It is not seeking to recover plan benefits . . . .’”314 Rather,
the provider “‘is bringing state-law claims based on the alleged shortcomings
in the communications between it and’ the insurer or the plan.”315
However, while this use of contract law may not necessarily contradict
ERISA’s intended purpose, the consistency of using a standard form contract,
or lack thereof, has hampered its effectiveness as a work-around.316 As
eloquently explained by the Third Circuit:
It is odd indeed that a pre-service agreement that sets forth the services to
be provided alongside the dollar amounts to be paid is not yet common
practice for out-of-network providers, particularly where a given provider
operates as a large-scale, sophisticated business entity, as it would provide
both parties with clarity and avoid the thicket of issues we find ourselves
in today.317

As discussed above, without a standard form, certain terms within the ad
hoc contractual agreement between an insurer and provider may default back
to the terms of the insured’s health care plan.318 Where this occurs,
preemption prohibits providers from bringing suit due to the impermissible
“reference to” the plan.319
Accordingly, providers should work toward establishing and instituting
effective standard form contracts to govern out-of-network service
provisions as appropriate and, to avoid any preemption, providers should
ensure that these agreements do not default to ERISA-plan-related terms.320
While these are not feasible in all situations,321 effective standard forms will
likely minimize the potential of a provider declining to provide specialized
311. See supra Part II.B.3.
312. See Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc. v. Cent. States Bd. Health & Welfare Tr. Fund,
538 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2008) (surveying cases identifying that common-law contractual
causes of action about independent agreements are distinct from those specifically revolving
around the terms of an ERISA-governed plan).
313. Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 752, 756
(10th Cir. 1991) (“An action brought by a health care provider to recover promised payment
from an insurance carrier is distinct from an action brought by a plan participant against the
insurer seeking recovery of benefits due under the terms of the insurance plan.”).
314. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 213 at 18 (quoting Franciscan Skemp
Healthcare, 538 F.3d at 601).
315. Id. (quoting Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, 538 F.3d at 601).
316. See Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.3d 218, 229 (3d Cir. 2020).
317. Id. at 229 n.14.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 220–22.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 220–22.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 220–22.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 225–26; Part I.B.2.

2302

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

out-of-network care as—in a last resort situation—providers’ lawsuits would
not face the risk of preemption that otherwise exists.322 Therefore, the
chances of a provider failing to receive adequate compensation would be
inherently lowered.
3. Employer Negotiation with Health Insurers
The third and final interim solution that could be deployed to combat the
impact of anti-assignment provisions is effective bargaining by employers on
their employees’ behalves. Courts assessing challenges to the validity and
enforceability of anti-assignment provisions have reiterated regularly that
they are pieces of private, freely-negotiated contracts.323 Employers—the
parties responsible for bargaining with insurers over the terms of the health
plans offered to employees—should take some responsibility for promoting
the interests of those employees when negotiating ERISA-governed health
plans.324 Though it may seem that the highly profitable U.S. health insurance
companies can afford to employ a “take it or leave it” attitude when offering
terms,325 in reality, employer-based health plans are the largest source of
coverage in the United States326 and “[e]mployers, especially large
employers, are usually able to obtain more favorable pricing and coverage
than individuals can,”327 signaling their bargaining power.
While business leaders may be unfamiliar with the minutiae of health
insurance contracts and see little value in directing significant attention to the
topic, it actually makes good financial sense “to understand the health care
benefits business,” as “[e]mployee health benefits consume more than $15
million annually per 1,000 employees.”328 Additionally, more than half of
U.S. adults receiving health insurance coverage from their employers have
indicated that it is a “key factor” in whether they stay at their jobs.329
Accordingly, if an employer believes that employees participating in a
health plan it offers have faced issues as a result of certain aspects of the
contract negotiated on the employees’ behalves, such as an anti-assignment
provision, the employer should work diligently to use its bargaining power
322. See supra text accompanying note 317.
323. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
324. See Vivian S. Lee, U.S. Health Care Is in Flux. Here’s What Employers Should Do.,
HARV. BUS. REV. (June 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/06/u-s-health-care-is-in-flux-hereswhat-employers-should-do [https://perma.cc/H287-YHAN] (“[E]mployers should shop and
negotiate for health care solutions with the same rigor they shop for their business needs. They
should challenge vendors to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of their programs to produce
better health and improve productivity, presenteeism, and quality of life for their
employees.”).
325. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Major U.S. Health Insurers Report Big Profits, Benefiting
from the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05
/health/covid-insurance-profits.html [https://perma.cc/T77C-KCNA].
326. KONGSTVEDT, supra note 22, at 38.
327. Id.
328. Lee, supra note 324.
329. Stephen Miller, Employees Are More Likely to Stay If They Like Their Health Plan,
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hrtopics/benefits/pages/health-benefits-foster-retention.aspx [https://perma.cc/QT4S-8XX3].
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to negotiate such provisions out of the contract. Employees, in turn, should
proactively inform the responsible individuals at their companies about any
hardship that they have experienced, both generally in utilizing their health
plans and specifically those that arise due to anti-assignment provisions.
Such combined advocacy efforts by both the employer and employee may
help to mitigate the ramifications resulting from anti-assignment provisions
detailed throughout this Note.
CONCLUSION
The anti-assignment provision has become a critical part of health
insurers’ attempts to minimize costs associated with the provision of health
care. Despite the urgency with which politicians and their constituencies
discuss healthcare today, anti-assignment provisions have failed to gain the
notoriety they warrant. This failure to acknowledge and investigate their
importance has led to the glaring lack of data and findings on their impacts,
leaving merely anecdotal evidence in arguments about anti-assignment
provisions.
This pitfall is especially critical in the context of employee health plans
given ERISA’s purported intention to protect employees and their
beneficiaries participating in such plans. While ERISA’s text is unclear
about the right to assign benefits due under such health plans and policy
arguments are persuasive in both directions, this Note ultimately contends
that the lack of clarity can only be resolved through the development of
sufficient empirical data. These findings, in turn, will guide Congress toward
a decision on whether or not an amendment to ERISA, such as the feasible
avenues outlined above, is warranted to address the effects of antiassignment provisions.

